Make Russia’s War Machine Collapse

Europe should not waste energy on discussing an envoy to a non-existent negotiation with Moscow, but concentrate on supporting Ukraine until Putin can no longer sustain the war

The Russian war machine will stop only when it collapses.This is the strategic reality Europe has to absorb. The aim is not to design a new accommodation with Putin’s Russia. The aim is to ensure that Ukraine can keep holding the line, that Europe can keep financing and supporting that effort, and that Russia’s war economy is forced to bear the accumulated weight of its own failure

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The real goal of supporting Ukraine is not to prepare an unlikely negotiation with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It is to make the Russian war machine collapse.

This does not mean waiting passively for Moscow to implode. It means helping Ukraine hold the line, deny Russia further territorial gains, and force the Kremlin to bear the accumulated military, economic and political cost of a war that it cannot win but doesn’t want to stop.

It may sound strange to say this about a war, but this is a relatively good moment for Ukraine. Not because the conflict is close to ending. It is not. Not because a meaningful negotiation is in sight. It is not. But because Ukraine’s expectations have lowered and its confidence in increased.

Since the failed counteroffensive of 2023, the war has been a grind. Russia has been gaining ground, but only very slowly. There was a time, particularly after the very successful first counteroffensive in the autumn of 2022, when Ukrainians felt they could repeat what they had done in Kharkiv and Kherson and liberate more occupied land. Back then, they were still supported very significantly by the United States, even if there were hesitations and caution in Washington and in Europe.

That is not where Ukraine is today.

If there was ever an expectation that Ukraine could retake all occupied territory militarily in the context of war, that expectation has now been lowered. Ukrainians may no longer believe they can recover everything they have lost by force in the short term. But this lowering of expectations has not produced defeatism. It has produced clarity.

A second trauma has also been internalised: the betrayal of the United States. It was pretty tough. Ukraine was stabbed in the back — or rather stabbed right in the face — in the Oval Office. And it was not a one-stab show. There were repeated stabs, culminating in the 28-point plan presented by the US that was essentially drafted in Moscow.

Ukrainians have absorbed this loss. They no longer expect the United States to be the actor it was at the beginning of the war. They assume that the temporary suspension of US oil sanctions on Russia will become permanent. They know that Washington is no longer the anchor on which they can base their war effort.

Yet this, too, has produced a different kind of confidence.

Ukraine has proved that it can hold the line despite the betrayal of the United States. It may not be able to regain what it has lost, but it is increasingly confident that it will not lose more. It may even regain a little ground while the war continues.

This confidence is based on facts. Four and a half years ago, when the large-scale invasion began, Ukraine was almost entirely dependent on military support from abroad, primarily from the United States and Europe. Today, between two-thirds and three-quarters of its military capacities are produced inside Ukraine. Even if the lower estimate is more realistic, this remains an extraordinary achievement in the midst of war.

Ukraine is holding the line primarily through capacities it produces itself.

At the same time, Russia’s situation is not improving. The Russian economy has been deindustrialised, with the exception of the war economy. Russia has suffered between 1.3mn and 1.5mn casualties over four and a half years. In that time, having already occupied about 14 per cent of Ukraine in 2014, it has taken only another 6 per cent. The cost has been enormous. The gains have been limited.

Ukraine’s second source of confidence is Europe.

This is broader than Viktor Orbán, though Orbán’s removal from the equation matters. Ukrainians understand that Europeans support them not out of the goodness of their hearts, but because there is an increasing recognition in Europe that European security passes through Ukraine. It starts in Ukraine, even if it does not end there.

This is not simply a war in Ukraine. It is a war between Russia — and Putin’s regime — and Europe as a whole. That is what gives Ukrainians confidence that, whatever happens, Europeans will have their back. Europe is in this because its own security is in this.

That does not mean Europe is acting only out of values. It is acting out of interest. But that is precisely why the commitment can be durable. As long as Europeans understand that Ukraine is the front line of European security, they will have a reason to remain engaged.

Precisely because of all this, this is also a moment of danger.

If this is visible from Kyiv and from Europe, something along these lines must also be reaching the Kremlin. Putin may listen only to what he wants to hear, but he cannot be entirely unaware of the direction of travel.

Russia has paid a huge price, has gained little, faces a worsening economic position, and has seen the Trump betrayal of Europe largely consume itself. In Trumpian language, the United States no longer has the cards on Ukraine.

This is why the level of alarm in the Baltic states is increasing. If you are desperate, you do desperate things.

There are no prospects whatsoever of a meaningful negotiation over Ukraine. This is what makes the conversation about European envoys so abstract and frankly pointless. The only interesting thing about it is that it implicitly acknowledges that the United States is out of the picture.

Nor would a hypothetical ceasefire necessarily be sustainable. This is not a war that is likely to end in compromise. Even if there were a ceasefire, there is little reason to believe it would hold. The Russian war bicycle will keep pedalling until it falls.

The Russian war machine will stop only when it collapses.

This is the strategic reality Europe has to absorb. The aim is not to design a new accommodation with Putin’s Russia. The aim is to ensure that Ukraine can keep holding the line, that Europe can keep financing and supporting that effort, and that Russia’s war economy is forced to bear the accumulated weight of its own failure.

Ukraine’s victory is the ability to deny Russia further gains. It is the capacity to survive the loss of American reliability and turn European support, domestic production and battlefield innovation into sustainable resistance.

Putin’s system cannot live without war. But it may not be able to live with this war forever.

This commentary is based on an edited version of Nathalie Tocci’s remarks at the IEP Bocconi digital event “How Can Europe Confront the Russian Threat in a Post-American World Order? Russia’s war economy, sanctions, Ukraine, and Europe’s deterrence challenge”, held online on 27 May 2026, with Bill Browder and Nathalie Tocci, moderated by Stefano Feltri.

Nathalie Tocci

Nathalie Tocci is a senior fellow of the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University. She has been Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali from 2017 to 2026. She has been Special Advisor to EU High Representatives Federica Mogherini and Josep Borrell. In that capacity, she wrote the European Global Strategy and worked on its implementation. She is also Professor of the Practice at SAIS Europe.

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